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THE RIGHT TO ACCESS EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS: WHY THE
FDA SHOULD NOT DEPRIVE THE TERMINALLY ILL OF A
CHANCE TO LIVE
Nicholas J. Plionis*
INTRODUCTION
Abigail Burroughs, a twenty-one-year-old honor student at the University of
Virginia, died of cancer on June 9, 2001.' Eighteen months earlier, doctors diagnosed
her with cancer of the head and neck, treating her with chemotherapy and radiation
therapy.2 By March 2001, this standard therapy for Abigail's type of cancer had
failed to yield significant improvement, and Abigail was hospitalized at Johns
Hopkins University Hospital.3 Abigail's treating oncologist urged the Burroughses
to attempt to obtain two different drugs, including Erbitux, which targets the same
growth receptors that Abigail's cancer cells expressed.4 However, Abigail could not
obtain Erbitux because it was approved only for clinical trials of treatment for colon
cancer; she also failed to qualify for a clinical trial involving a second drug, Iressa.5
Abigail was "stymied in her efforts to obtain new cancer drugs that her oncologist
believed could save her life," despite the fact that the drugs were available to others
in clinical trials.6 In May 2001, Abigail was finally admitted to a clinical trial for a
new cancer drug, Tarceva, but by then was "too ill to travel from Virginia to the Texas
testing site."7 Abigail died two weeks later.'
Frank Burroughs, Abigail's father, described the entire experience of trying to
find treatment for his daughter as a "horrible, horrible nightmare." 9 He formed the
* J.D., William & Mary Law School, 2008; B.S., University of Virginia, 2005. I would
like to thank my family for their support in helping me become the person I am today. My
parents devoted their lives to the education and upbringing of my siblings and me, and
without them, we would have very little to show for ourselves in this world.
Complaint at 2, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. McClellan, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 03-1601).
2 Robert Cohen, Ruling May Upend Drug Safety Precautions, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Feb. 12, 2007, at 1.
3 Abigail Alliance, The Abigail Story, http://abigail-alliance.org/story.htm (last visited
Feb. 14, 2008).
4 Id.
' Cohen, supra note 2.
6 Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
7 Cohen, supra note 2.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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Abigail Alliance, an organization that hopes to expand access to "experimental drugs
outside the clinical trial setting" for terminally ill cancer patients.' ° Frank summed
up the organization's purpose by saying "[p]eople just want a chance to live when
they are facing death."" In order to accomplish its mission, the Abigail Alliance
filed a lawsuit to "enjoin the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from continuing
to enforce a policy that violates the constitutional privacy and liberty rights of
terminally ill patients.""
In Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach
(Abigail I),13 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that a "terminally ill,
mentally competent adult" patient has a right under the Due Process Clause 4 to
access experimental drugs that have passed FDA Phase I trials when no alternative,
FDA-approved treatments exist or are successful. 5 For simplicity, this narrowly
defined right will be referred to in this Note as the "right to access treatment." The
Abigail Alliance sought this right to access treatment because U.S. law currently
bars the sale of new drugs that have only passed FDA Phase I trials. 16 The finding
of a right to access treatment was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit on rehearing en banc in August 2007 (Abigail 11). 17 This Note argues that
the court's recent denial of a fundamental right to access treatment is wrong and
will use Abigail I as a guideline to illustrate why recognition of the fundamental right
to access treatment for terminally ill, competent adults is constitutionally supported
and should be incorporated into the FDA's approach to regulating new drugs.
With this background of how the case in Abigail I arose, this Note will explore
the initial holding of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the historical and
legal context surrounding the right to access treatment, and how the ruling impacts
the FDA's policy regarding access to experimental drugs. The first Part of this Note
examines Abigail I and outlines what the right to access treatment means, as explained
by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in its initial holding. The court used
the precedent established in Washington v. Glucksberg8 and Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey'9 to determine whether the right to access
10 Id.
1 Id.
12 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1.
13 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .....
'5 Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 486.
16 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000).
17 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach (Abigail I1), 495
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
"8 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
'9 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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treatment is a fundamental right found in the Due Process Clause.2' The second Part
outlines common law and American legal history that may support a right to access
treatment. This Part also examines the history of the FDA's creation and illustrates
why the FDA's purpose is compatible with recognition of this right. The third Part
analyzes the right to access treatment in the context of modem substantive due process
jurisprudence. Supreme Court precedent often requires the government to defer to
individual choice over state interest with regard to personal medical choices. 2' The
fourth Part introduces the FDA's current approach to regulating new drug manu-
facturing and also outlines some of the practical problems the system imposes on
terminally'ill individuals, for whom conventional treatments either do not exist or
are ineffectiv-. The fifth and final Part proposes a solution that would reconcile the
recognition of a fundamental right to access treatment with the FDA' s tradition of
promoting public safety.
The purpose of this Note is not to extensively discuss administrative policy,
though some initial recommendations are included for how to accommodate both public
safety and the right to access treatment. The FDA should allow earlier access to post-
Phase I experimental drugs and increase safety at the end of the drug testing process.
The FDA should use the invitation extended by Abigail Ito review its entire regulatory
process of testing experimental drugs as a whole. Rather than front-loading expensive
testing for safety and efficacy before any new drug can be marketed to any population,
terminally ill or otherwise, the phases of testing should be spaced out in longer
increments, with expanded access and marketing as the drug progresses through
clinical trials. This may also help in preventing some of the criticism aimed at the FDA
resulting from drugs being too widely available after initial testing, such as in the
controversy surrounding Vioxx.
22
The FDA could still prohibit access outside the clinical trial setting to any
experimental drug until Phase I testing for basic safety is complete. Then, in accordance
with the right to access treatment, patients should have access to experimental drugs
only when they are terminally ill and are not extensively worried about long-term
side effects of an experimental drug. To qualify for experimental drugs, patients
must have the mental competence to understand and assume the great risks involved
with experimental drugs, including failed efficacy or even hastened death. The
FDA should continue to limit access to new drugs by the general population until
testing for efficacy and extended safety screening occurs. The right to treatment
outlined in Abigail I can thus be accommodated without sacrificing public safety.
20 Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 476.
21 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding the
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
22 See Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Is Criticized over Its Handling of Drug Safety, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 23, 2006, at A3.
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In consideration of this country's present and historical respect for the natural
right of an innocent person to preserve his own life, and in consideration of the
individualist, entrepreneurial spirit that successfully drives the market place
decisionmaking, the FDA should revise its policies and allow for greater access for
the terminally ill to post-Phase I experimental drugs.
I. ABIGAIL ALLIANCE
The Abigail Alliance sought "access to potentially life-saving post-Phase I
investigational new drugs on behalf of mentally competent, terminally ill adult
patients who have no alternative government-approved treatment options." 3 Because
the Abigail Alliance claimed a right warranting protection under established substantive
due process jurisprudence in a case that was "of first impression, '"24 the court in
Abigail I searched Supreme Court precedent for a method of analysis from which
to proceed. The court discovered two methods of analysis: one established in the
1960s and 1970s, most recently affirmed in Casey;26 the other from the Court's
1930s jurisprudence, but most recently applied in Glucksberg.27 The Abigail I court
started with the Glucksberg analysis, reasoning that it was the more restrictive of
the two and that if a new right to access treatment existed under the Glucksberg
approach, it would certainly exist under the Casey method.28
The Court in Glucksberg had two criteria for analyzing a claimed right.29 "First,
we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.' "30 In examining this first criteria, the Abigail I court
explored the right to access treatment in the context of the common law to
determine its historical grounding.3' For example, William Blackstone wrote that
a person has the fight to "his life, his limbs, his body, [and] his health" as well as
23 Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 472.
24 Id. at 475.
25 Id. at 475-76.
26 Id. at 476.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 477. In addition to being the more recent precedent, Glucksberg had a majority
holding supported by three currently sitting Justices, while the Casey plurality was supported
by only two current Justices, making Glucksberg the precedent more likely to be used for
deciding future cases. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 704 (1997); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843 (1992) (plurality opinion).
29 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
30 Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion)).
3' Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 480.
[Vol. 16:901
THE RIGHT TO ACCESS EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS
right of self-defense and self-preservation.3 2 The right to self-preservation is so strong
that a person may generally
defend himself against another by force intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily harm, when he reasonably believes that
(a) the other is about to inflict upon him an intentional contact or
other bodily harm, and that (b) he is thereby put in peril of death
or serious bodily harm or ravishment, which can safely be pre-
vented only by the immediate use of such force.33
The court also described how U.S. tort law generally imposes liability on people who
interfere with a third person giving aid for a bodily injury to a wounded person.34
The court drew an analogy between a terminally ill individual fighting off a disease
and a person fighting off a deadly attacker.35
The court also described the history of laws inhibiting or regulating access to
treatment.36 The U.S. government did not regulate drug manufacturers for safety
reasons until 1906 and did not regulate for efficacy until 1962. 37 Federal law strictly
prohibits the introduction and sale of new drugs into interstate commerce without
FDA approval, which includes submitting proof of safety and efficacy.3" The
Kefauver-Harris Amendments gave the FDA the power to require more stringent
testing for safety and efficacy, greater power to inspect manufacturing and advertising
practices, and the power to require more complete disclosure of all testing results
for an experimental drug, including drugs proven to have adverse effects.39 The
court noted that very little in the FDA's history indicated that the primary purpose
of the agency was to regulate which patients could have access to experimental
32 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *125, *127, *130.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65(1) (1965).
34 Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 480-81.
31 See id. at 480.
36 Id. at 481-83.
37 Id. at 481-82.
38 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)-(b)(1) (Supp. III 2003):
(a) No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed
pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect
to such drug.
(b)(1) Any person may file with the Secretary an application with
respect to any drug subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of this
section. Such person shall submit to the Secretary as a part of the
application (A) full reports of investigations which have been made to
show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is
effective in use ....
'9 Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 482.
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drugs and that the focus was instead on preventing fraud and reckless disregard for
general public safety.' In sum, the court concluded that there was evidence of a "long-
standing tradition of the right of self-preservation."'"
In addition to finding that a fundamental right must be rooted in the nation's
history, the Court in Glucksberg had a second prong in its test requiring that the
right be "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [it was] sacrificed."' 4 2 The Abigail I majority considered Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health43 for support that a right to access treatment
is implicit in ordered liberty." The court explained that "[ilf there is a protected liberty
interest in self-determination that includes a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment,
even though this will hasten death, then the same liberty interest must include the
complementary right of access to potentially life-sustaining medication, in light of
the explicit protection accorded 'life."'45 The court, by analyzing the right to access
treatment in comparison with the right to refuse treatment, wisely invoked Cruzan
as a recent Court decision that successfully found a previously unrecognized fundamen-
tal right under the Due Process Clause.' The question is whether a right to refuse life-
saving treatment is analogous to a right to access treatment.47
The court in Abigail I ensured that it proceeded with caution in defining the
contours of the right to access treatment. The test in Glucksberg "required... a
'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest."4 The court in
Abigail I noted that the plaintiffs did not seek access to post-Phase I drugs for the
entire U.S. population or to overturn the Controlled Substances Act, which claims broad
authority to regulate potentially harmful substances.49 The court emphasized that
the plaintiffs were seeking a narrowly-tailored right, anticipating criticism that the
court invented a new right under substantive due process jurisprudence.50 The court
exercised "reasoned judgment' ' by focusing on the narrow right to access treatment as
opposed to finding, for example, a broad, expansive "right to treatment," which could
40 Id. at 483.
41 Id.
42 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1990) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
43 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
44 Abigail I, 445 F.3d at 484.
41 Id. at 484-85.
46id.
41 See infra Part 1Il.
48 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1990).
49 Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 478.
'0 See, e.g., Editorial, A Court Makes up a Right, WASH. POST, May 3, 2006, at A22.
"1 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (discussing the
cautious, but open-minded approach courts should take in evaluating claims of new
fundamental rights).
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be construed to impose affirmative duties on the government to subsidize the cost
of experimental treatments for terminally ill patients.52
The court examined and distinguished cases from other circuits that addressed
variations on the right to access treatment sought by the Abigail Alliance.53 The court
acknowledged that in Rutherford v. United States, the Tenth Circuit held that the
right to access treatment being sought by the Abigail Alliance did not exist.54 The
Rutherford court, comparing the right to access treatment with a right to refuse life-
saving treatment, noted that
[i]t is apparent in the context with which we are here concerned
that the decision by the patient whether to have a treatment or not
is a protected right, but his selection of a particular treatment, or
at least a medication, is within the area of governmental interest
in protecting public health.55
In explaining why the right to access treatment did not exist, the Rutherford court
noted that "[iut is apparent from the record that the proponents did not conduct the
research and the laboratory testing required under the prevailing procedures, and it
thus must be held that they did not meet their burden" to convince the FDA that the
proposed drug accommodated public safety.56 According to this court, all patients
must, to some minimum degree, seek to accommodate the FDA's concern for public
safety in seeking to access experimental drugs.57
The Abigail I court implied that the same result in Rutherford would be reached
even with the existence of a fundamental right to access treatment because the
government's interest in protecting the entire population, terminally ill or otherwise,
with basic safety precautions may be a compelling interest allowing government
action to override the right to access treatment.58 Though the government has a valid
interest in promoting public safety for all patients generally, it does not necessarily
follow that the Rutherford court's complete deference to all FDA safety and efficacy
procedures, at the expense of any recognition of the interest of terminally ill patients in
accessing experimental drugs, is the only way to satisfy this governmental interest.59
52 Abigail I, 445 F.3d at 478.
" Id. at 486.
54 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980).
" Id. at 457.
56 id.
17 See id.
58 Id.
" See id. (noting that "[in this case, the government's interest may prove to be weaker
because the Alliance seeks only access to investigational new drugs that the FDA, after Phase
I human trials, has deemed sufficiently safe").
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The opponents to Abigail I criticized the majority's finding of a new right under
the Due Process Clause as an act of judicial activism.6° They attempted to recast
the right to access treatment as a question of
whether the Due Process Clause of the Constitution mandates
access to experimental drugs that have cleared Phase I of FDA
testing, such that Congress cannot protect terminally ill patients
from the risks experimental drugs present unless it uses a means
narrowly tailored toward achieving a compelling interest in
61limiting access.
The opponents were bothered about mandating access and corresponding obligations
on the government to provide treatment, but the only mandate of the right to access
treatment is for the government to remove itself as an obstacle for terminally ill
patients with nothing left to lose who choose to seek potentially life-saving experimental
drugs. The dissent also was mistaken in considering the risks of experimental drugs
in a vacuum. 62 Instead, the risks should be considered in the context of a terminally
ill patient who is facing an almost certain death because of failed or non-existent
conventional treatments.
The opponents to Abigail I more wisely attacked the right to access treatment
through its roots in the common law history63 upon which the majority relied for
justification of the right.64 The dissent in Abigail I, relied heavily on United States
v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, which involved patients seeking
medicinal marijuana based on the common law defense of necessity. 65 The Court
in Oakland noted that "[u]nder any conception of legal necessity, one principle is
clear: [t]he defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has made a 'determina-
tion of values.' ,,66
6o Id. at 488 (Griffith, J., dissenting) ("Instead of allowing the elected branches to resolve
these debates, the Alliance argues that the Constitution mandates its desired outcome,
regardless of the particular balance already struck by Congress and the Executive."); Abigail
II, 495 F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008)
(No. 07-444) ("Having thus been rejected by the FDA, the Alliance turned to the courts ... ").
The "opponents to Abigail r' include the dissent in Abigail I and the majority in Abigail H.
Both opinions were written by Judge Griffith.
61 Abigail , 445 F.3d at 491 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
62 See id. at 488-90 (discussing the general new drug applications and the extensive and
time-consuming FDA testing phases that drugs must go through to ensure general safety and
effectiveness).
63 See, e.g., Abigail I, 495 F.3d at 703-07.
64 Abigail/, 445 F.3d at 491-92.
65 Id. at 492, 296; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
6 Id. at 491 (citation omitted).
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The problem with comparing the right to access treatment in Abigail I with the
right to access medicinal marijuana is that the right to access treatment is restricted to
only those instances in which lives are imminently threatened.67 The right to access
treatment is only for terminally ill patients and only for treatments that are considered
potentially life-saving--otherwise the missing element of life-saving necessity
blunts the importance of a constitutional right.68 Congress, through the Controlled
Substances Act, affirmatively declared that marijuana is a substance with no medicinal
properties,69 while the experimental drugs at issue are being tested in clinical trials
because there is a possibility that they have medicinal, life-saving value.
TheAbigail IIopinion lists various state law provisions regulating drug safety.7°
However, these statutes regulated the safety of poisons and adulterated drugs for the
population at large, not potentially life-saving drugs for the terminally ill. The
majority would have us believe a statute regulating the sale of deteriorating drugs
and the sale of poisons evidences an intent to regulate all drugs in all contexts. 71
The opponents to Abigail I were successful in pointing out that there is very little
statutory history ever explicitly defending or encoding a right to access treatment.7 2
If the Abigail Alliance was seeking deregulation of all drugs, surely the majority's
argument would be relevant. But ignoring the context of the right to access treatment
(terminally ill patients seeking a last chance to extend their lives with drugs having a
basic level of safety testing) makes these historical notes irrelevant to the discussion.
The opponents, however, have more trouble disentangling the right upheld in
Cruzan from the right to access treatment sought by the plaintiffs. The dissent in
Abigail Ibegan by summarizing how the majority depended on Cruzan: 'The [Cruzan]
Court's assumption that there is a right to refuse lifesaving treatment in some
circumstances was predicated upon 'the common-law rule that forced medication
was a battery[] and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse
unwanted medical treatment.'" 7 3 The dissent then tried to disentangle freedom to
refuse unwanted medical treatment from a right to access treatment by arguing that
"a tradition protecting individual freedom from life-saving, but forced, medical
treatment does not evidence a constitutional tradition of providing affirmative access
to a potentially harmful, and even fatal, commercial good."74
67 See Abigail I, 445 F.3d at 486 (majority opinion).
68 See id. (summarizing the issue at hand as involving only "potentially life-saving
drugs"). The extent to which a drug must demonstrate this potential would be a concern
going forward. See id. (discussing government's interest in public health).
69 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000).
70 Abigail II, 495 F.3d 695, 703-06 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189
(U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
71 Id. at 704.
72 Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 491-92 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 495 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997) (discussing
Cruzan)); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
74 Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 495.
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The dissent never explained why a patient refusing life-saving treatment has a
right under the Due Process Clause to take risks with his life, but a patient is not
allowed to take risks with his life through actions that are likely the only possible
way to save it. If the former is based on a long standing tradition that forced medical
care constituted battery,75 why cannot the latter be based on the tradition that blocking
someone from receiving medical help constitutes a tort?
76
One way to think about the Abigail I and H opinions is to ask whether the plaintiffs
are more similar to the patient in Cruzan, who wanted to be free from government
interference in choosing a medical procedure, or more similar to the patient in
Glucksberg, who requested a traditionally unprotected liberty that is strongly
antithetical to the state's interest in promoting the preservation of life. The Abigail H
court did not realize that, at their core, the rights recognized in Abigail I and Cruzan
seek to prevent an interferer (the government) from overriding what the patient
determines, in good faith, is in her best medical interest.77 And unlike the right to
suicide sought in Glucksberg, which may be considered an attempt to protect a bad
faith medical choice made out of despair to end life,7" the right to access treatment
embraces a patient's hope to prolong life.
The dissent wondered whether the right to access treatment opens a sort of
Pandora's box of practical problems:
If a terminally ill patient has such a right, are patients with
serious medical conditions entitled to the benefit of the same
logic and corresponding access? If an indigent cannot afford
potentially life-saving treatment, would the Constitution mandate
access to such care under the right recognized by the majority?
Can a patient access any drug (i.e., marijuana for medicinal
purposes) if she believes, in consultation with a physician, it is
potentially life-saving? ... Perhaps most significantly, what
potential must a treatment have in order for the Constitution to
mandate access?79
These questions indicate that the dissent mistook a broad right to treatment with the
narrowly-tailored right to access treatment sought by the plaintiffs.8" The right
should only be held by terminally ill patients, not chronically ill patients, because
for them the FDA's policies restricting access to experimental drugs have the most
75 id.
76 See Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 480-81 (majority opinion).
77 See, e.g., supra notes 32-35, 46 and accompanying text.
78 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711-712.
79 Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 499 (Griffith, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
80 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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serious consequences: premature death.81 The right to access treatment only seeks
to remove the government as an obstacle to treatment, not guarantee a provider of
treatment.82 Access in this case should be likened to prescription drug access: one
should be allowed to buy a prescription drug, in consultation with and under the
recommendation of a doctor, if he or she privately contracts with a supplier to provide
it. This analogy also answers the other questions the dissent posed. 3
The right to access treatment described and defended in Abigail I has solid
grounding in the fundamental right of self-defense. As the next Part explains, the
extension of the right of self-defense to the cause of the Abigail Alliance is based
in a deep respect for the right of any innocent individual to use dangerous methods
to defend against a life-threatening attack.
II. HISTORICAL NOTIONS OF LIBERTY AND How THE FDA CAME TO BE
In order to comply with Glucksberg, the court in Abigail I had to find historical
support for the existence of a right to access treatment.84 The court found support
in the commentaries of William Blackstone, who wrote that "[f]or whatever is done by
a man, to save either life or member, is looked upon as done upon the highest necessity
and compulsion.8 5 Samuel Pufendorf, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke, along with
Blackstone, all believed that self-preservation was a natural right.86 It is reasonable
to think that, based on the writings of these influential men, the drafters of the Bill
of Rights believed that a "right of self-preservation" would be an inviolable natural
right of man, even though the right was never explicitly enumerated in the Bill of
Rights.87 A broad right of self-preservation supports the narrowly-tailored right to
access treatment and shows how this right is at least minimally rooted in America's
legal tradition.
Certain tort cases in American legal history embody a right of self-preservation
in the common law and strengthen the historical support for the right to access
81 Cf. Abigail I, 445 F.3d at 474 (noting the three stages of FDA testing take seven years
and terminally ill patients "have no other [timely] options").
82 See id. at 486 (discussing that the right to access treatment seeks only to provide "the
same right of access enjoyed by those terminally ill patients lucky enough to secure a spot
in Phase II trials").
83 A patient in consultation with his or her doctor should be allowed to pursue any drug
which they together decide is in the best medical interest of the patient. The likelihood that
doctors would collude with patients to fraudulently obtain treatments that are not actually
reasonably believed to be life-saving is beyond the scope of this Note.
84 Abigail I, 445 F.3d at 479.
85 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 126.
86 See J.D. Droddy, OriginalistJustification and the Methodology of UnenumeratedRights,
1999 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 809, 858.
87 Id. at 859; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
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treatment. The court in Abigail I highlighted some of these cases in which "a person is
faced with death, [and thus] necessity often warrants extraordinary measures not
otherwisejustified." s In Ploofv. Putnam, the court considered whether the defendant
committed trespass or negligence when his servant unmoored a ship tied to his dock
by the plaintiff.8 9 The plaintiff moored his ship to the defendant's dock out of concern
for the safety of his family because of a sudden and violent storm that threatened
them with imminent, possibly fatal harm.' ° The court considered whether the plaintiff
had a legal right to be moored to the defendant's dock because of the doctrine of
necessity: "Th[e] doctrine of necessity applies with special force to the preservation
of human life.... One may sacrifice the personal property of another to save his life
or the lives of his fellows."91 This reasoning suggests that tort actions should not
apply to individual actions taken out of self-preservation, even when the action itself
trespasses upon another's property.
In Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., the court considered another case
involving the doctrine of necessity.92 The plaintiff, a wharf owner, sued the defendant,
a ship owner, for negligence.93 This case is similar to Ploofbecause it involved one
party mooring his ship to the opposing party's dock without the owner's consent.94
The mooring party, the defendant in this case, invoked the doctrine of necessity to
support his legal right to moor his ship to the plaintiff s dock; he was trying to avoid
having to sail into a coming storm. 95 The court considered the importance of a right
of self-preservation when it wrote:
[A] starving man may, without moral guilt, take what is necessary
to sustain life; but it could hardly be said that the obligation would
not be upon such person to pay the value of the property so taken
when he became able to do so. And so public necessity, in times of
war or peace, may require the taking of private property for public
purposes; but under our system of jurisprudence compensation
must be made.96
The court would not require the defendant to unmoor his ship so as to avoid trespassing
on the plaintiffs wharf and therefore require the defendant to put his life and
88 Abigail I, 445 F.3d at 480.
89 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908).
90 Id. at 188.
91 Id. at 189.
92 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
93 Id. at221.
94 See id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 222.
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property in imminent danger.97 The defendant, however, had to compensate the plaintiff
for the damaged wharf.98 The Vincent holding is another example in the American
legal tradition of valuing self-preservation of life over the destruction of another's
property without the owner's consent. Vincent, however, may also represent the
principle that though a right of self-preservation may exist, it should not be without
cost to those parties acting to preserve their own life.99 This precedent is helpful in
determining who should bear the costs in enforcing a right to access treatment and
supports the proposition that this right only allows access and does not require
government funding of these treatments. 'oo
There is little other American case law that extensively weighs the right of self-
preservation against material concerns; though the few cases that have considered
the matter have all found self-preservation the greater good.' The right to access
treatment is just one expression of a right of self-preservation: instead of facing violent
storms, terminally ill patients face fatal diseases. In a modern context, the Court in
Glucksberg found that there was never common law or statutory approval of suicide
or physician assisted suicide such that there could be support for a constitutional
right to suicide. 0 2 The cases dealing with a right of self-preservation have one
important feature not present with the right to suicide at issue in Glucksberg: the
person seeking to protect a personal choice concerning his well-being was trying to
extricate himself from a perilous, life-threatening position."°3 The Court in Glucksberg
cited Blackstone's Commentaries as evidence that there never was, and there is not
currently, a fundamental right to act to destroy one's life." The holding in Glucksberg
comports with the right to access treatment; though there may be no historical
support for a right to destroy one's life, there is historical support for a right to preserve
one's life, even if it means imperiling a third party's property.'0 5
9' Id. at 221.
98 Id. at 222.
99 See id.
'"0 But see Abigail I, 445 F.3d 470, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Griffith, J., dissenting)
(considering whether a right to access treatment would require that terminally ill patients,
especially the indigent, gain access to experimental drugs without having to personally pay
for the treatment), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W.
3189 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
' George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral
Points of View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975, 988 (1999).
'02 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997).
103 See Christie, supra note 101, at 994-95.
" Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at7l1-12. The Court noted that Blackstone believed suicide was
"self-murder" and that "the law has... ranked [suicide] among the highest crimes." Id. at 712
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 189).
'o' Compare 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189 (declaring suicide a high
crime), with 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130 (supporting a right of self-
preservation generally).
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The history of the FDA may shed some light on the strength of the government
interests likely to be at issue when considering whether a right to access treatment
exists.' 6 The FDA's emergence can be explained by a series of twentieth-century
pieces of legislation, with each law "emerg[ing] in the wake of public outcry over
sensational events involving drug safety."' ' The government began regulating drugs
in 1906 with the Pure Food and Drug Act.'08 The Act focused on drug purity, making
it a misdemeanor to adulterate or misbrand a drug."° The focus of this law was
preventing situations in which drug manufacturers had clearly manufactured fraudulent
treatments." 0 The government should have the legal authority to shut down drug
manufacturers who are proven to be only selling snake oil treatments, and this is not
at issue in this Note. This goal should be a continuing, or even increased, focus of
the modem FDA." ' The 1906 act "did not, however, limit individual access to new
drugs or regulate therapeutic claims by drug manufacturers.""' 2
Federal law again increased governmental scrutiny of drug manufacturing in
response to 107 deaths caused by the use of Elixir Sulfanilamide, which was marketed
without ever being tested for safety or efficacy." 3 Congress passed the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to ensure drug manufacturers tested new drugs for safety,
though the law did not require testing for efficacy." 4 The law required drug manufactur-
ers to file a New Drug Application (NDA) which would demonstrate at least some
scientific assurance of safety." 5 The drug manufacturer could market its new drug
unless the FDA decided the drug was unsafe." 6 The restrictions at this point were still
at their most basic, requiring that the manufacturer give at least some consideration
to the safety of its consumers but not requiring any evidence of efficacy."'
The final major piece of legislation that defined the modem FDA was the Kefauver-
Harris Amendment of 1962, which itself was a response to the birth defects caused
106 See generally Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683-86 (Ariz. 1987) (listing the
legitimate state interests that may limit the right to refuse life-saving treatment, including
preserving life, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession, preventing suicide, and
protecting innocent third parties).
107 C. Frederick Beckner, EII, Note, The FDA's War on Drugs, 82 GEo. L.J. 529,529 (1993).
'0' Richard J. Nelson, Note, Regulation of Investigational New Drugs: "Giant Step for
the Sick and Dying"?, 77 GEO. L.J. 463, 467 (1988).
109 Id.
"o See id. at 468.
"' See infra Part V.
112 Abigail I, 445 F.3d 470,481 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
"3 Beckner, supra note 107, at 528-29, 529-30 n.7.
"'4 Abigail!, 445 F.3d at 482.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See id.
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by the morning sickness drug Thalidomide." 8 The amendment used the Interstate
Commerce Clause to prevent the manufacture of any new drug without meeting FDA
approval based on seven factors, including safety and efficacy." 9 The amendment
gave the FDA expanded powers, which allowed the agency "to approve human clinical
trials, regulate drug advertising, inspect drug-manufacturing facilities, and promulgate
good manufacturing practices.... [and] require[] drug manufacturers to disclose to
the FDA any information they received regarding the adverse consequences of
approved drugs."'
121
The legislative progression that structured the modem FDA suggests that agency's
mission concerns protecting unknowing consumers from careless or conniving drug
manufacturers. It is true that "[e]xperimental drugs present a variety of potential
risks and benefits to patients"'' and that the purpose of the FDA's regulation of
experimental drugs is to "determine[] and balance[] those risks and benefits" because
"[s]ome drugs may harm patients; others may help."'12 2 The court in Abigail I was
not trying to undo these protections for unknowing consumers who prefer to trust
in the FDA's judgment but merely tried to allow consumers for whom these protections
had little practical value the option of pursuing treatments they believe are in their
best interest-self-preservation. 123 This is consistent with the early American legal
tradition in which individuals were allowed to take dangerous actions that promoted
self-preservation. 1
24
Another way to analyze Abigail I is to determine to what extent each individual
in society can decide what actions promote his own self-preservation when these
actions are balanced against legitimate governmental interests. The current limits
on similar medical rights, like the right to refuse life-saving treatment, will provide
an appropriate template for this consideration in the next Part.
mII. CURRENTLY RECOGNIZED TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF ORDERED LIBERTY AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR A RIGHT TO ACCESS TREATMENT
Traditional notions of ordered liberty found in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, as first enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 25 are important
118 David Leo Weimer, Safe-and Available-Drugs, in INSTEAD OF REGULATION 239,
245 (Robert W. Poole, Jr. ed., 1982).
"9 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000).
'20 Abigail I, 445 F.3d at 482-83.
121 Id. at 486 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
122 id.
123 See id. at 472 (majority opinion) (explaining that the plaintiffs were seeking to enjoin
an FDA policy barring early access to investigational drugs for terminally ill patients, not
requiring these patients to have state subsidized access or forbidding the FDA from issuing
recommendations).
124 See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
125 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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parts of the legal context surrounding the right to access treatment. Griswold relied
on "penumbras" in the Bill of Rights, which are "formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance."' 126 The Court then declared that
a Connecticut law prohibiting married couples from using contraceptives was in
violation of a "right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights."'27 Essentially, the Court
reasoned that the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments
implicitly encoded a "right of privacy" in the Constitution that prevents the state
from regulating how married couples may engage in private sexual activity because
this activity has been recognized as a fundamental right in American legal history. '28
The Court did not give a detailed description of how English or American common
law and statutory law regulated marital sexual privacy, yet still found the activity
to be protected.
29
The importance of allowing an individual to make health-related choices affecting
bodily integrity permeates modem substantive due process jurisprudence. In Eisenstadt
v. Baird, the Court considered the constitutionality of laws making the distribution
of birth control to an unmarried woman illegal in light of the infringement on an
individual's right of privacy. 130 The Court wrote that "[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.' 13 1 Like Griswold, the Court struck down a law when
it directly regulated the sexual activity and procreative choices of human beings. '32
The Court in Roe v. Wade held that the right of privacy in the penumbras of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause supported a right for a woman to
terminate her pregnancy.'33 The reason that personal medical decisions are frequently
the subject of due process privacy rights is because these issues are often a matter
significantly affecting quality of life and thus "so fundamentally affect[] a person.'""3
The phrase "so fundamentally affecting a person"' 3 5 would have no meaning if
it did not include matters of life or death, considering that one must be alive to
enjoy any other right. The right to access treatment, because it protects a terminally
ill patient's last chance to preserve her own life, is thus a matter of life and death,
and it so affects a person's private concern for her health that it could neatly fit in
the due process jurisprudence created by Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe.
126 Id. at 484.
127 Id. at 486.
128 Id. at 484-86.
29 See id.
130 405 U.S. 438,440, 443 (1972).
1'' Id. at 453.
132 Id. at 452-53.
133 410U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
'3 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
135 id.
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Aside from the importance of privacy as applied to personal medical decisions,
the importance of privacy as an unapplied, abstract idea is vital to the meaning of the
Due Process Clause. The Court explained:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signif-
icance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfac-
tions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized man.'36
The government should respect choices, even risky ones, an individual makes as
long as the choices are made in a good faith effort to preserve one's privacy or health.
This is not to say that a right of privacy embodied in the right to access treatment
would allow a terminally ill patient to take drugs for which no basic testing for
safety has occurred.'37 The idea of privacy, as expressed in Roe, could clearly
support a right to access treatment: if a patient's privacy is so strong that women are
protected from government interference when they make medical decisions like
whether to have an abortion, which potentially harms innocent third parties, privacy
could also shield medical decisions that are made in good faith to prolong a
patient's life.
Although the fundamental right of privacy as expressed in cases like Eisenstadt
could protect a right to access treatment, the cases that most heavily rely upon a
right of privacy are from a past era of substantive due process jurisprudence.' 38 The
Court in Casey, however, considered whether five provisions of a Pennsylvania
statute violated a woman's right to make a medical decision to have an abortion and
effectively reexamined how broadly the Due Process Clause should be interpreted. 1'39
The Court reaffirmed Roe and determined that "[c]onstitutional protection of the
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause"
136 Id. at 453 n.10 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
137 Such a policy may be so reckless as to be analogous to patients who wish to commit
suicide in pursuit of their happiness. The Supreme Court has clearly proclaimed that such
recklessness is not constitutionally protected. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
711 (1997).
138 Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe were decided in 1965, 1972, and 1973, respectively. See
supra notes 125, 130, 133.
131 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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and that the "controlling word in the cases before us is 'liberty."" '  The Court, in
determining how the right to an abortion fit amongst other rights previously upheld
under the Due Process Clause, noted that the law grants "constitutional protection
to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing, and education .... [matters] involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, [that] are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'41 One common theme among these rights is that they involve individuals
making decisions in their pursuit of happiness which do not pose a threat of harm
to any constitutionally recognized legal entity.'42 The Court, having reaffirmed its
commitment in Roe to the idea of a right of privacy, decided that the right was not
absolute and was subject to certain regulations.'43 The state's interest in protecting
fetal life can at some point during a pregnancy-after viability--eclipse the liberty
interest of an individual.' The reasoning of the Court suggested that the more
narrowly-tailored a proposed right under the Due Process Clause, such that it does
not interfere with an appropriate state interest, the more likely it is consistent with
the right of privacy.
145
In a case more factually similar to the one brought in Abigail I, the Court expanded
on the principles espoused in Casey in its analysis of the case of a woman in a
vegetative state named Nancy Cruzan. 146 In Cruzan, the Court considered whether
Nancy's guardians had the right to withdraw her life support under the Constitution. 147
The Court summarized the right from unwanted medical treatment by stressing that
"[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."'148
The right to access treatment sought by the Abigail Alliance may be inferred
from Cruzan. The Court in Cruzan found that individual medical choices, when clearly
and competently expressed, can override government actions that may prolong an
140 Id. at 846.
141 Id. at 851 (citation omitted).
142 The right to access treatment does not threaten harm to any innocent third party but
may threaten harm to the terminally ill patient who uses experimental drugs for which safety
testing, though substantially done, is not complete. See Abigail I, 445 F.3d 470, 473 (D.C.
Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189
(U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
141 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851-53, 869.
'44 See id. at 869.
145 The Court, recognizing the Due Process Clause has "boundaries [that] are not susceptible
of expression as a simple rule," advised that courts should be cautious and exercise "reasoned
judgment" when interpreting due process rights. Id. at 849-50.
146 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990).
141 Id. at 267-68.
148 Id. at 278.
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individual's life.'49 The state traditionally succeeds in interfering with an individual's
choice of medical treatment when it erred on the side of prolonging life.' This is
because "[t]he state's interest in preserving life is the most significant interest
asserted by the state."'' The Abigail Alliance sought to allow terminally ill patients to
make individual choices that, though involving risk, are good faith attempts to
prolong life.' If there is a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment because
traditional notions of privacy protect patients from government interference and
government interference is at its strongest when it errs on the side of prolonging
life, then personal medical decisions to use experimental drugs that are made in an
attempt to prolong life are amongst the strongest and most fundamental interests a
person can have. The right to access treatment, thus, should be protected under the
Due Process Clause.
The majority in Abigail I, responding to criticism from the dissent that Cruzan
does not imply a right to access treatment, explained how the Court may extrapolate
from substantive due process case law precedent: "Were it impermissible to draw any
inferences from a broader right to a narrower right.., nearly all of the Supreme Court's
substantive due process case law would be out of bounds."'5 3 The Court should
easily embrace a right to access treatment if it chooses to embrace a right to refuse
life-saving treatment. Logically the right to refuse life-saving treatment and the
right to access treatment are inextricably linked, and either both exist or neither do.
IV. THE FDA's CURRENT APPROACH AND ITS PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
A. Paternalism
As previously mentioned, the FDA' s structure is based on legislation regulating
the manufacture of new drugs that passed in phases between the early and late
twentieth century before "external controls" existed."M The current system, however,
149 See id. at 278-79.
"0 See, e.g., id. at 281-82 (holding that Missouri could set a high evidentiary requirement
for proof of an individual's choice of withdrawal of treatment).
' Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (Ariz. 1987).
152 Abigail I, 445 F.3d 470,472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
3 Id. at 481 n.12. The court listed examples:
See, e.g., Griswold (inferring specific right to use contraception from
general right to be free from intrusion into "sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms"); Roe (identifying specific right to terminate a pregnancy
from broader right to privacy); Moore (extrapolating from broader
constitutional protection for "the sanctity of the family" to specific right
to determine extended family living arrangements).
Id. (citations omitted).
"' Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs:
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is based on pre-market stringent testing for safety and efficacy because of the history of
disastrous consequences with inadequately-tested, marketed drugs. 55 The dissent in
Abigail I discussed the mechanics of the FDA's current policies regulating new drugs:
Phase I involves the initial introduction of a new drug into human
subjects.... In addition to addressing the effectiveness of a new
drug, Phase II studies are used "to determine the common short-
term side effects and risks associated with the drug." Phase I1
studies "gather ... additional information about effectiveness and
safety that is needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship
of the drug." The FDA further requires some drugs to go through
Phase IV studies, which "delineate additional information about
the drug's risks, benefits, and optimal use."'
15 6
The FDA's testing procedures are front-loaded with stringent testing before marketing,
presumably to prevent the type of disasters that begot the enabling legislation at the
foundation of the FDA. 157
The FDA's approach of front-loaded testing is a policy that makes sense when the
only goal is making sure the drugs that do go to market are safe and effective. Safety
and efficacy should be important if the majority of drug manufacturers seek approval
for unsafe or ineffective drugs. One journal reported that "11 percent of drugs-and
only 6 percent of cancer drugs-that enter clinical testing are ultimately approved;
the rest either prove to be too toxic or do not work."' 58 This means that the vast
majority of drugs submitted for approval by drug manufacturers are ultimately
ineffective at increasing the health of the patient, and in some cases, the drugs are
actually adverse to a patient's health. The FDA's policy of front-loaded testing is
reasonable, but this does not mean it is the optimal way of balancing the needs of
terminally ill patients with public health.'5 9
The FDA's policies can be characterized as a form of "[r]egulatory paternalism."'6 °
The policies allow the agency to act as a gatekeeper that must approve all drugs before
they can enter the market, which gives the agency the authority to limit which drugs
An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REv. 181, 183 (1999).
' See supra Part H1.
156 Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 488-89 (Griffith, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
'17 Id. at 482-83 (majority opinion).
158 Susan Okie, Access Before Approval-A Right to Take Experimental Drugs?, 355 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 437, 439 (2006).
159 See id. at 439-40.
"6 Michael D. Greenberg, Information, Paternalism, and RationalDecision-Making: The
Balance of FDA New Drug Approval, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 663, 674 (2003).
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patients and their doctors may choose for the treatment of an illness.'6 ' This amounts
to paternalism considering "the extent that individual freedom is subordinated to the
licensing discretion of a government agency."162 Based on the FDA's statutory history
and the motivations for the agency's power, the entire aim of the FDA is to protect
a vulnerable public from unscrupulous drug manufacturers and charlatans.' 63
This, however, ignores an important function of the FDA's new drug approval
process. When the FDA requires proof of safety and efficacy, it also "generate[s]
rigorous and systematic data on drug safety and effectiveness."'" Though this data
is necessary to the FDA's primary function as a gatekeeper for the public safety, it
also accomplishes an important task for even those who decry the paternalistic aspect
of the FDA's policies: it provides information about new drugs that independent
doctors and patients need to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs on their
own.'65 And though one may adopt the position that the FDA's paternalistic priority is
ill-conceived and may believe that all individuals should be personally responsible
for regulating which types of treatments a physician may administer, that individual,
in order to act rationally, would still need basic information about the safety and
efficacy of new drugs.
Ultimately, the FDA relies on a paternalistic motivation and justifies its authority
"based on the premise that certain kinds of information about new drugs do not exist
a priori, and are not likely to be generated in a free market."' 66 This allows the FDA
to be the sole entity to ensure that necessary safety and efficacy information about
new drugs exists. 67 It does not necessarily follow, however, that the FDA is the only
entity capable of making rational decisions about how to use information about new
drugs once it is generated and disseminated to doctors and patients. This is not to
say that the FDA should not pass judgments on the proper use of new drugs after
they go through a Phase I clinical trial that ensures basic safety standards are satisfied;
the FDA just should not make their recommendations mandatory, thereby substituting
their judgment for those of competent, adult patients in consultation with their
doctors. The FDA's substituted judgment is especially problematic for terminally
ill individuals, who have no reason to care about the results of comprehensive clinical
trials that test for proven efficacy or long-term side effects of new drugs, but instead
care only about Phase I trials that test for immediate adverse reactions.'68 The
161 See id. at 671.
162 Id. at 672.
163 See supra notes 106-24 and accompanying text.
"6 Greenberg, supra note 160, at 673.
165 See id. at 672.
'66 Id. at 674.
167 See id.
168 When someone is terminally ill, the main concern about a new drug is that it is not so
dangerous as to immediately kill them in the hope that it may prolong life, even if the side
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"orthodoxy of the FDA clinical trial scheme" can be reasonably-though not
necessarily---considered a waste of time for patients who face imminent death. 169
Were the FDA to relinquish its paternalistic role to accommodate a right to access
treatment, society would need to trust that terminally ill patients would for the most
part make rational decisions based on informed consent. 170 In Glucksberg, the Court
recognized that the government may have an appropriate interest in "protecting the
vulnerable from coercion."171 In denying that there was a right to physician-assisted
suicide, the Court emphasized the primacy of state interests over individual liberty
when it warned that "[l]egalizing physician-assisted suicide would pose profound
risks to many individuals who are ill and vulnerable."' 72 The Court noted that the main
threat to the ability of terminally ill patients to make rational medical decisions was
that "many [terminally ill patients] might resort to [suicide] to spare their families
the substantial financial burden of end-of-life health-care CoStS.' 173 This concern
is justifiable and validates the government's paternalistic concern when erring on the
side of preserving life over individuals choosing death; but in the case of the right to
access treatment, patients are also erring on the side of prolonging life, and in fact,
it is their driving motivation. 174 Patients should not be allowed to make reckless
decisions but should be allowed, in consultation with their doctor, to choose from
various new drug treatments that have passed Phase I safety trials. 75
The concern in Glucksberg for vulnerable populations does highlight that the right
to access treatment can be limited by certain safeguards that protect legitimate govern-
ment interests, and the Abigail Alliance recognized these limits. 176 For review, these
safeguards include limiting access to only terminally ill patients, 177 who are the only
effects were to eventually prove to be fatal in the long run (beyond the initial estimated time
of death). See Complaint, supra note 1, at 5-6.
169 Greenberg, supra note 160, at 675.
170 Although the FDA's current process does assist patients in obtaining information about
treatments. See id. at 671, 674.
171 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731-32 (1997).
172 Id. at 732 (quoting NY STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAw, WHEN DEATH Is
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THEMEDICAL CONTEXT 77-82 (May 1994)).
173 Id.
174 See Abigail 1, 445 F.3d 470,472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
171 It may be helpful to think access to pre-Phase I experimental drugs or access to
experimental drugs without a doctor's recommendation are akin to the type of reckless
disregard for life that was unprotected in Glucksberg. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729-30
(discussing how the government has a legitimate interest in preventing the harm posed by the
disregard for life involved in suicide).
176 See Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 472 (noting that access would be limited to drugs that had
undergone Phase I clinical human trials).
177 For one accepted standard of what it means to be terminally ill, see Oregon Death with
Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800 § 1.01(12) (2005) (defining terminally ill as having
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population with the support of the fundamental right of self-preservation and, thus,
have interests strong enough to defeat paternalistic governmental concerns. However,
because terminally ill patients are vulnerable to coercion in making important medical
decisions, 178 the right to access treatment may include other safeguards, such as limiting
access to post-Phase I drugs, thereby ensuring some basic safety precautions have
been met when patients take experimental drugs; 179 limiting access to patients who
have a doctor's prescription, thereby bolstering patients' informed consent by requiring
expert advice when they make their medical decisions; 80 and limiting access to
competent, adult patients. '
8
B. Balancing Access with Safety
The next consideration is what type of practical problems occur because the FDA's
policy is reactive to public outrage concerning medical disasters rather than a more
level-headed approach. Society pays a price for the extra costs incurred when
regulations err on the side of stringent pre-market safety and efficacy, and these
costs, including delays in access, highlight some of the shortfalls in the FDA's current
policy.182 There are also direct costs to individual patients, though these costs indirectly
affect everyone because anyone may contract a life-threatening illness.
The first burden to consider is the economic price society pays for the stringent
assurances of safety and efficacy. Consider that "[w]hile the FDA's exercise of
regulatory authority over prescription drugs and medical devices has increased the
safety and reliability of drugs ... these benefits are not without costs.... [They]
require [] exhaustive testing and substantial scientific evidence of safety and efficacy
before [the FDA] will approve any new product."' 83 Though this increased safety
"an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within
reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months").
178 See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
179 Abigail I, 445 F.3d at 472.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug UserFeeAct: Is a Faster Food and Drug
Administration Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 261,
274 (2005). These costs include:
First, industry pointed out, longer review times translated into greater
R&D costs.... Second, and more importantly, industry pointed out that
for each extra month that FDA took to review an NDA, the manufacturer
lost a month in marketing a drug with patent protection and, therefore,
without any generic competition.... Third, due to the drug lag, many
manufacturers felt compelled to move their facilities overseas so they
could capture earlier market profits.
Id.
183 Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs
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and efficacy is desirable in itself, it may not be desirable when considered beyond
a vacuum of unlimited resources."8 The costs of testing for new chemical compounds
that have never been approved by the FDA can be especially high. 185 For example,
approval of the food additive Olestra took twenty-one years, 100,000 pages of research
data, and development costs of 300 million dollars. 186 This cost is the average price
tag for the development of new drugs in general, though the average time from the
first clinical trials to FDA approval is eight and a half years.'87 The effect of the
high costs of testing before the drug can be sold on the market is clear: only companies
with vast financial resources can afford to invest in new drug treatments, reducing
the overall availability of new drugs. 8 8 The FDA has little incentive to reduce the costs
of testing, because the agency is likely to conclude from its entire statutory history
that Congress only pays attention to the effectiveness of the FDA's regulations when
marketed drugs cause medical disasters. 89
The cost of drug testing itself may be substantial, but the opportunity cost for the
time it takes to do the testing exacerbates the problem. Drug manufacturers now have
to obtain government approval before any marketing of new drugs.' 90 When one
considers that "th[e] increase in [FDA] regulation was accompanied by an increase
in the amount of time it took for a pharmaceutical company to proceed from the
discovery of a new drug to FDA approval.... [and that] [t]he delays were more
staggering.., than most had expected," the financial impact is significant.' 9' Drug
manufacturers should be allowed to market these new drugs once initial safety
testing, done in Phase I, determines that the drugs are not immediately harmful. This
also assumes that drug manufacturers should be allowed to charge terminally ill patients
for the right to use experimental drugs. That initial flow of money could help pay
for expanded testing later on. Thus, the right to access treatment may actually help
defray development costs. 192
and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERs
L. REv. 883, 886 (1996).
"8 See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant to Dance: Privatizing the FDA
Review Process, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 651, 656-57 (1996).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 657. It is important to note that the additive was not meant for treatment of an
imminently life-threatening illness but as a fat substitute. Id. at 657 & n.40.
187 Id. at 656.
188 Id. at 657.
189 See id. at 655.
1' See Promotion and Charging for Investigational Drugs, 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(1) (2007)
(outlawing drug manufacturers from promoting an IND as safe and from charging patients
for investigational drugs under an IND without FDA approval).
19' Zelenay, supra note 182, at 261.
192 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the right to
access treatment is narrowly defined so as to not place a positive burden on the government
to provide experimental drugs to indigent patients.
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Aside from the financial downsides of the FDA's policy, there are consequences for
terminally ill patients who cannot wait for investigational drugs to be proven safe,
or even scientifically effective, over the long-term. '93 The FDA's policies "prohibit
access to investigational therapies for noninvestigational purposes. In effect, patients
lose access to potential treatments while anxiously awaiting proof of efficacy."' 94
Some staggering estimates indicate that the delay caused by regulatory testing can
be devastating for terminally ill patients: one libertarian think tank, the Cato Institute,
estimated that "FDA delays in allowing US marketing of drugs... have cost the
lives of at least 200,000 Americans." '195 This is not surprising considering that the FDA
is not primarily concerned with lives that might have been saved by access to
experimental drugs, especially when the delay in access is caused by stringent testing
standards developed to avoid the media frenzy resulting from harms caused by under-
investigated drugs.'96 That does not mean, however, that there are not deaths that
would not happen but for delays caused by pre-market testing or that it would not be
worthwhile to find a meaningful solution that reconciles giving terminally ill
patients access to experimental drugs and protecting the public from reckless drug
manufacturers rushing unproven drugs to market.
The FDA's pre-market review and approval process imposes a significant barrier
to access to new drugs for terminally ill patients who do not qualify for clinical trials of
experimental drugs.'97 The FDA attempted to provide at least one alternative
pathway for terminally ill patients to use new drugs through an informal process that
created a "compassionate use Investigational New Drug [IND] exemption." '98 This
exemption was designed to "treat serious or immediately life-threatening diseases
or conditions without adequate available therapy."' 99 Exemptions were provided
to patients "on a case-by-case basis" and depended on the discretion of the FDA and
a pharmaceutical company to provide the experimental drug.2" In 1987, the FDA
formalized and revised the compassionate use IND procedure, providing broader
'9' Complaint, supra note 1, at 6-8 (reviewing the cases of terminally ill patients that gave
rise to the suit by Abigail Alliance).
" Lois K. Perrin, Note, The Catch-22 for Persons with AIDS: To Have or Not to Have
Easy Access to Experimental Therapies and Early Approval for New Drugs, 69 S. CAL. L.
REv. 105, 106 (1995).
19 Daniel Green, Obstacle Course for Drug Producers: Pressure for Reform of the US
Food and Drug Administration is Growing, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 21, 1995, at 12.
196 See supra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
197 Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug
Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 315 (2000).
198 Id. at 315-16.
199 Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,148
(proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
200 Greenberg, supra note 197, at 316.
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access to new drugs when certain criteria are met.2"' The criteria included whether
the intended disease was life-threatening and whether there were other approved
treatment alternatives.20 2 This IND regulation, thus, embodies some of the goals the
Abigail Alliance sought in its right to access treatment.20 3
The AIDS crisis in the 1980s provided the impetus for increased use of this IND
regulation.23 4 At the onset of the epidemic, contracting AIDS was akin to receiving
a death sentence because of the lack of any effective conventional treatment.2 5 The
FDA' s statutory framework, having been previously constructed in response to disasters
involving drugs already on the market, now had to respond to AIDS patients for
whom "the possibility that an experimental treatment could be unsafe or ineffective
became largely irrelevant., 206 The FDA allowed its first IND exemption for certain
AIDS patients even before the 1987 IND regulations, which once in effect, expanded
the opportunities for other AIDS patients.2 7
The FDA's expanded access to treatment, however, still had many shortfalls. AIDS
patients sometimes complained that the IND treatment programs for certain drugs
were not broad enough.20 ' For example, some patients were excluded from a study
of a drug called Trimetrexate because conventional treatments, though not effective,
were not adverse. 29 This distinction seems arbitrary because patients in both
circumstances still needed treatment beyond the conventional treatments and both
were facing life-threatening illnesses. This example also demonstrates one of the
benefits of making access to treatment a fundamental right; the right removes some
FDA discretion, which can be used to impose seemingly arbitrary restrictions on
who gains access to experimental drugs if the agency is out-of-touch with the needs
of terminally ill patients.2t0
Congress made mild changes to the approval process for experimental drugs when
it passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA). 2 1 1
The purpose of the FDAMA was to respond to "concerns about inconsistent policies,
inequitable access, and preferential access for certain categories of disease."'2 12 The
201 Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,148.
202 Id.
203 Abigail 1, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
204 Greenberg, supra note 197, at 296.
205 ld.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 312, 318.
201 Id. at 320.
209 Id. at 320 n.146.
210 See id. at 320.
211 Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
212 Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,149
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changes were meant "to emphasize that 'opportunities to participate in expanded
access programs are available to every individual with a life-threatening or seriously
debilitating illness for which there is not an effective, approved therapy. ' ' 213 The
modifications included explicit statutory authority for the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to "authorize the shipment of investigational drugs or investigational
devices for the diagnosis, monitoring, or treatment of a serious disease or condition
in emergency situations. '"214
Federal law also allows patients, acting through their physicians, to request new
drugs from pharmaceutical companies when certain conditions are met.21' The first
condition is whether the patient's physician has determined that the probable risk
of the investigational drug is less than or equal to the probable risk of the unabated
progression of the disease for which no conventional therapy is successful. 26 The
second condition is whether there is "sufficient evidence of safety and effective-
ness" for the requested investigational drug as determined by the Secretary.21 7 The
third condition is whether the Secretary believes the emergency provision of the
investigational drug will interfere with the beginning, continuance, or completion
of clinical trials. 218 And the final condition is whether the drug manufacturer submits
to the Secretary an appropriate protocol, describing how the patient will use the
investigational drug.219
After having met all of the above qualifications, the Secretary can allow the use
of a new drug for the patient if seven different factors are met.22 Some initial problems
with this Act are apparent when considered in the context of the case of Abigail
(proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
213 Id. (citing Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of Conference in H. REP. No.
105-399,.at 100 (1997)).
214 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(a) (2000).
215 Id. § 360bbb(b).
216 Id. § 360bbb(b)(1).
217 Id. § 360bbb(b)(2).
218 Id. § 360bbb(b)(3).
219 Id. § 360bbb(b)(4).
220 Id. § 360bbb(c). The seven factors include: (1) the drug is intended to treat a life-
threatening or serious illness; (2) there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative treatment
for the illness or stage of disease from which the patient is suffering; (3) the drug is under
investigation for the illness that is the subject of the proposed use or the drug has completed all
clinical trials necessary for approval; (4) the drug manufacturer is actively pursuing market
approval for the investigational drug for the use the patient is requesting the drug to help
cure; (5) the emergency provision of the investigational drug will not interfere with ongoing
clinical trials; (6) when the drug is used to treat a serious disease, there must be some
evidence of safety or efficacy; and, (7) when the drug is used to attempt to treat a life-
threatening illness, "the available scientific evidence, taken as a whole, provides a reasonable
basis to conclude that the investigational drug... may be effective for its intended use and
would not expose patients to an unreasonable and significant risk of illness or injury." Id.
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Burroughs. The first drug Abigail's physician attempted to procure for her was
Erbitux.22' Erbitux was in a clinical trial to treat colon cancer, not Abigail's cancer
of the head and throat.2 22 Abigail could not procure the drug under the FDAMA
because it would be in violation of section 561 (c)(3) as it was under investigation
for treating a different type of cancer than Abigail's type.223 This result seems arbitrary
when one considers that the physician proposed Erbitux for Abigail because her cancer
cells expressed the same type of receptors Erbitux targeted in colon cancer cells.224
When one considers the time frame from the initial diagnosis of a life-threatening
disease to death another problem emerges. First, the patient must try conventional
treatments in order to invoke the FDAMA.225 Then, the patient's doctor must find
a drug that may reasonably be helpful, convince the manufacturer to provide the drug,
develop a protocol for the drug's use, and convince the Secretary that it meets the
criteria of the FDAMA.226 Consider that Abigail, after unsuccessfully trying conven-
tional treatments, lived for only three months before her death.227 The right to access
treatment should shorten the time frame it would take to get access to investiga-
tional drugs once conventional therapies fail because there would not have to be
bureaucratic approval requiring the satisfaction of up to ten criteria. Recall that the
right to access treatment would not be absolute; safeguards in the FDAMA would
limit the scope of the right if the application of the right is contrary to "narrowly tailored
'compelling interest[s]. '"228 Patients should also be required to have a physician
recommend a new drug that, though of unproven efficacy via clinical trials, is
reasonably expected by some degree of medical reasoning to be useful for the patient.
One last important provision of the FDAMA is that it allows the Secretary to
"inform national, State, and local medical associations and societies, voluntary health
associations, and other appropriate persons about the availability of an investigational
drug. ' 229 The purpose of this provision was "[t]o specifically address concerns that
physicians and their patients are often unaware of the availability of investigational
drugs under access programs."23° If patients had a right to access treatment, programs
that spend valuable resources on publicizing these governmental access programs
221 See supra text accompanying note 4.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 2, 5.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 2, 5.
224 See supra text accompanying note 4.
225 21 U.S.C. §§ 360bbb(b)(1), 369bbb(c)(2).
226 See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
228 Abigail , 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that once a fundamental right is
recognized, the government can burden it in specific circumstances), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
229 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(c)(7).
230 Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,149
(Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21. C.F.R. pt. 312).
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would not be necessary because doctors who treat terminally ill patients would know
that patients who did not respond to conventional therapies and who could afford
to buy the investigational drugs would have de facto access to any post-Phase I drug
the doctor thinks might treat the illness.
The government may nobly desire to prohibit drug manufacturers from marketing
new, unproven drugs to terminally ill people because of concerns that unscrupulous
manufacturers will only be selling false hope to patients who are at their most
vulnerable. This type of paternalism does not fairly reflect the liberty interests of
patients concerning medical decisions.13' The FDA's policy needs to balance concern
for pre-market safety and efficacy with the knowledge that, unless there is a policy
that broadly lets terminally ill patients gain early access to the most promising
investigational drugs, every delay in getting the successful drugs to market costs the
lives of terminally ill patients.2 32 The FDA can accommodate the right to access
treatment in keeping with its primary concern of protecting the public.
V. PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE
This goal of this Note is not to lay out a comprehensive regulatory scheme for
implementing the right to access treatment, but some consideration of specific
recommendations is necessary to demonstrate how this right can be implemented
as a matter of policy. With that in mind, the FDA's current conservative approach
manages to attract criticism from two types of special interest advocates . 233 This is
a dilemma because "[t]he [FDA] is caught in pincers between two intense political
pressures: demands from the industry and the political right to move faster and faster
in approving drugs, and rising insistence from consumer groups and the left to show
more caution. ,23' These two concerns, though seemingly diametrically opposed, are
not irreconcilable. In fact, the FDA's optimal policy should be a compromise between
the needs of manufacturers, the public, and terminally ill patients.
Abigail I and II represent only the litigation component of the plaintiff s drive
for the right to access treatment.235 A legislative proposal by the Abigail Alliance
details a policy of how the FDA could accommodate industry and patient concerns
at the beginning of the approval process.236 The proposal establishes a three tier system
for access to experimental drugs: Tier 1 approval is based on Phase I testing and
231 See supra Part III.
232 See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
233 Rochelle Sharpe, FDA Tries to Find Right Balance on Drug Approvals, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 20, 1999, at A24.
234 Id.
235 See, e.g., Press Release, Abigail Alliance, Abigail Alliance Supports ACCESS Act (Nov.
10, 2005), available at http://abigail-alliance.org/AbigailAlliancesupportsACCESSAct.1-.pdf.
236 Okie, supra note 158, at 439.
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
preclinical evidence;237 "Tier 2 approval would correspond to today's [FDA] accelerated
approval;"23 and Tier 3 approval to what is currently full approval. 23 9 This system,
which accommodates the right to access treatment, would essentially make access to
drugs available on a spectrum in which drugs become more publicly available as
they are proven by the FDA to be safer and more effective.
Part of the solution involves improving safety and efficacy testing at the end of
the process, rather than front-loading all of the testing at the beginning.24 The result of
current FDA policies is that "[i]n practice, pharmaceutical companies have simply
not completed the definitive followup studies mandated by accelerated approval
status. ' 241 As the FDA requires so much testing from drug manufacturers before a drug
can be marketed to the public, complacency can set in after a drug is approved for
a specific use because the FDA has limited requirements for ensuring post-approval
safety and efficacy.24 2 However, this complacency can be avoided by easing the strict
prohibition on marketing experimental drugs at the front end, thus giving drug
manufacturers an initial cash flow from their new drugs, while allowing the FDA to
reserve the right to require more testing before the drug has full approval to test the
market.24 3 Specifically, one report recommended that the FDA can increase the
variety of safety and efficacy information the public has about new drugs if it
"reevaluate[s] safety ... within five years after initial approval... and the agency...
[has] authority to place a wider range of restrictions on drugs it deems risky."2"
The improvement in the timing of various phases of drug testing does not mean
other adjustments should not be made. Scholars argue that "Congress should amend
the FDAMA to require the FDA to establish and maintain a qualified clinical trial
registry. It should also grant the FDA power to mandate and enforce private drug
manufacturers to participate in the registry." '245 The more information publicly
237 Id. Tier I drugs "could be marketed for seriously ill patients who had exhausted other
treatment options, if they waived the right to sue the manufacturer and permitted collection
of their clinical data." Id.
238 id.
239 Id.
240 See Abigail I, 445 F.3d 470, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Griffith, J., dissenting)
(summarizing FDA drug approval procedures), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
241 Perrin, supra note 194, at 146.
242 Id. ("Dr. Ellen Cooper, Director of Clinical Research at the American Foundation for
AIDS Research, states that '[o]nce a drug is on the market.., companies feel less compelled
to conduct expensive studies to show it is effective."').
243 See Shankar Vedantam, FDA Told U.S. Drug System Is Broken; Expert Panel Calls
for Major Changes, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2006, at Al.
244 Id. at A8.
245 Amanda J. Dohrman, Note, Rethinking and Restructuring the FDA Drug Approval
Process in Light of the Vioxx Recall, 31 J. CORP. L. 203, 217 (2005).
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available, the easier it would be for doctors and patients to make informed medical
decisions, and the easier it would be to accommodate the right to access treatment.
Despite the decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to rehear Abigail I
en banc in 2007 and reverse the judgment of the court upholding the right to access
treatment,246 the FDA has not ignored the court's prior decision and made a decision
to review and propose a modification to its policies regarding access to INDs for the
terminally ill. 247 The new proposal "make[s] it easier for researchers, drug companies
and research institutes to determine how much they could charge patients getting
drugs early. ' 246 In proposing a change in the regulations governing experimental drugs,
the FDA sought to "increase awareness and knowledge of expanded access programs
... [to] make investigational drugs more widely available in appropriate situations. 249
The changes the FDA proposed in its new rule are curious because the rule "aims
to clarify, and thereby expand, the situations in which expanded access to unapproved
drugs could be available., 250 As this Note explored, the main problems regarding
the right to access treatment for terminally ill patients are not simply the result of
a lack of publicity about existing laws and programs. It is difficult to comment on
the particular changes because the rule has not been finalized yet.251 The FDA,
however, still has too much discretion in determining which details of an IiND use
affect the availability of a new drug for terminally ill patients. For example, proposed
rule 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a) makes the showing of safety and efficacy of drugs for
terminally ill patients dependent on the size of the population for which the drug
will be distributed, requiring a higher showing of safety and efficacy as the size of
the targeted population grows.252 Whether there is one Abigail Burroughs or one
thousand who are in need of the same type of cure, the situation does not change for
the individual patient who faces imminent death and rationally decides she has nothing
to lose in assuming the risks of trying a new drug. And though FDA employee Janet
Woodcock noted that "[w]e're simplifying the process, 253 Frank Burroughs, Abigail's
father, remained skeptical of whether the newly proposed FDA rule respects the
individual rights of terminally ill patients.2-4 He advised that "[t]aking current policy
246 Abigail II, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Jan.
14, 2008) (No. 07-444).
247 Rob Stein, FDA Reveals Plan for Wider Access to Experimental Drugs, WASH. POST,
Dec. 12, 2006, at A10.
248 Id.
249 Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,149
(Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified as 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
250 Id. at 75,150.
2" See id. at 75,147.
252 Id. at 75,151.
253 Stein, supra note 247, at A10.
254 Id.
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and putting it into [formal] regulation does nothing to help many cancer patients and
others with serious life-threatening illness that could be helped. 255
CONCLUSION
This Note demonstrated that there is a need for a right to access treatment that
it is constitutionally permitted and that the FDA can and should accommodate this
right with its primary concern for the safety of new drug treatments. Imagine having
cancer and, after unsuccessfully trying every conventional treatment, your doctor
recommends an experimental drug that may be your only chance, albeit a minuscule
chance, of surviving longer than six months. Would you care whether this drug had
no proven history of efficacy, but a doctor believes there is still some small likelihood
that it may be beneficial? Would you care that it may have side effects that could
prove to be harmful in the long-run? For some terminally ill patients, the answer to all
these questions is "no." Others may say "yes" and choose to avoid taking any risks
in experimental drugs. But for a terminally ill patient who wants to assume the risks
and take this last chance at survival, the FDA either delays the process by requiring the
patient to go through lengthy bureaucratic procedures or flat out denies this opportunity.
The Supreme Court already recognizes a right to refuse life-saving treatment.256
A terminally ill patient is free to refuse treatment, even if it means hastening death
and contradicting the government's interest in managing risks that threaten the lives
of its terminally ill citizens. This precedent, grounded in our nation's legal history
and other substantive due process jurisprudence, strongly implies that a terminally
ill patient should be free to decide to pursue treatment, even if it contradicts the
government's interest in managing risks that threaten the lives of all its citizens.
There are two final examples in support of the right to access treatment, without
which, this Note would be incomplete. J. Scott Ballenger, the lead counsel for the
Abigail Alliance in its appeal to the Supreme Court, provided two examples in a
recent lecture of how the right of self-preservation is embedded in both our substantive
due process and common law jurisprudence. 7 First, the Court in Roe v. Wade, and
every court hearing an abortion case since Roe, has developed a legal framework
regulating abortion that included a permanent exemption from government intervention
when the abortion was necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.5 8 This
exemption was not based on the right of privacy or supporting autonomy in family
planning, but was based on a common law right of self-defense. 9 This exemption
255 Id.
256 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
257 Podcast: Should the Government Insert Itself Between Dying Patients and Unproven
Therapies?, Policy Forum held by the Cato Institute (Sept. 25, 2007), available athttp://www
.cato.org/podcasts/.
258 id.
259 Id.
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is grounded in the right of an individual to preserve his own life and trumps almost
any state interest, including the state's strong interest in the life of a fetus during the
third trimester.2' The right to access treatment is grounded in the same fundamental
right of self-defense that grounds the right to have an abortion when the pregnancy
threatens the life of the mother.
Second, imagine a law that made it illegal for a woman confronted with a rapist
to fight back.26" ' The governmental interest behind such a law could be that: (1)
fighting back against a rapist increases the risk that a woman will face life-threatening
harm, (2) the government has a legitimate interest in preventing women from increasing
the risk of death they face when confronted with a third party attacker, or (3) the
governmental interest trumps the woman's decision, though made in good faith, that
fighting back is her best option to preserve her life because such a decision is often
futile.262 Such a law may seem practically infeasible, but assuming that fighting
back does in fact increase the likelihood of death and even assuming that fighting
back is often futile, would not the law still be likely to be unconstitutional? Which
right would one invoke to challenge the constitutionality of such a law? It seems
that one would have to rely on a right of self-defense found in both common law
principles and modern substantive due process jurisprudence.263 There is no difference
between the rapist in the prior example and cancer cells that threaten terminally ill
patients represented by the Abigail Alliance except that the latter is played out over
a longer time frame and the government has prevented terminally ill patients from
fighting back.
It is important to keep in mind that giving terminally ill patients access to
experimental drugs is not akin to giving them a cure that will stave off or even prevent
death. Every patient who takes an investigational new drug should have realistic
expectations about the probabilities of obtaining an effective treatment and the
probabilities of being subject to a treatment that hastens her death. It might even
be helpful to discourage characterizing the right to access treatment as giving hope
to terminally ill patients, because for some patients, it may be more painful to have
their hopes dashed by the realities of the low success rate of investigational new
drugs. How this type of personal crisis affects a patient depends on how the patient
defines herself. Because the choice is so personal, so fundamental to who a person is,
it is to these patients the choice of whether to take a chance on a new drug should be
offered. The FDA can still protect its important function of acting as a gatekeeper in
approving new drugs for most situations. But it is not just a matter of compassion to
allow competent, adult, terminally ill patients to be the gatekeepers of their own bodies
when they have nothing left to lose; it is a matter of preserving human dignity.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 id.
263 Id.
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